CAPITAL CONTROLS, SECTORAL FLOWS & COVID-19

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The need for more refined data on capital controls

- Research on capital controls plagued with data issues:
 - No clear **definition** of capital controls
 - No **granularity** by type of instrument
 - No measure capturing the **intensity** of capital controls actions
 - Small number of **observations**
- New dataset on capital controls adjustments (Lepers and Mehigan 2019):
 - ✓ Moving beyond slow-moving indices to tightening/easing
 - ✓ More comprehensive coverage 2300 adjustments, 51 econ, 2000-17

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✓ Split by **instruments**

Extended in Lepers and Mercado (2020) to include:

✓ Split by <u>Sectors</u>

Capturing the extensive and intensive margins of controls



Adding a sectoral breakdown to capital controls

- **Neither obvious, nor trivial:** controls are usually applied to specific transactions rather than specific sectors
- **BUT** major categories of controls appear to fit better a **sectoral classification**:
 - Controls on banks, pension funds, insurance outward transactions
 - FDI restrictions (See OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index)
 - Controls on natural persons, controls on NFC external borrowing ...

> What do we do?

- Classification of 2300 control adjustments whether they apply to OFC, NFC, BK or all sectors
- Classification **based on the resident sector**, i.e., the investor sector for outflow controls and investee sector for inflow controls
- Number of capital control adjustments is summed up in each year within each sectoral control category for each country



On resident flows:

On non-resident flows:

■BK ■NFC ■OFC ■BK ■NFC ■OFC 50 50 30 30 10 10 -10 -10 -30 -30 -50 -50 -70 -70 -90 -90 -110 -110 — -130 -130 — -150 --150 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2000 2004 2012 2002 2006 2008 2010 2014 2016 BK —NFC —OFC BK NFC OFC



Sectoral capital controls & Sectoral flows: Empirical Analysis

$$CF_{i,j,t} = \alpha + X_t^G \beta' + X_{i,t-1}^D \gamma' + \delta Controls_{i,j,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- Narrower focus to **emerging economies** & **tightening** actions
- Interested in the effectiveness of tightening actions for emerging economies, including those in Asia, in reducing sectoral flows and not on the more structural trend of capital account liberalisation
- Lagged K controls because of endogeneity/ delay in impact



	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Non-Resident Flows	BK	NFC	OFC	
Baseline: S	Sectoral Inflows			
Correspond. Sectoral Controls	-0.090	-0.389**	-0.091*	
	(0.096)	(0.160)	(0.051)	
		1		
Controls	on inflows to NI vith lower flows t	FC and OFC to these sect	associated ors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Resident Flows	BK	NFC	OFC	
Baseline:	Sectoral outflows			
Correspond. Sectoral Controls	0.211	0.181	0.095	
	(0.624)	(0.245)	(0.159)	
		(**=**)	(0.137)	

Sensitivity Tests

On non-resident flows:

On resident flows:

	BK	NFC	OFC		BK	NFC	OFC
Winsorised s	ectoral inflow	'S			ctoral outflows		
Correspond. Sectoral Controls	-0.068	-0.209*	-0.089*	Correspond. Sectoral Controls	0.220	0.159	0.146
	(0.090)	(0.112)	(0.045)		(0.577)	(0.175)	(0.112)
Without count	try fixed effec	ts		Without countr	y fixed effects		
Correspond. Sectoral Controls	-0.191*	-0.791***	-0.106*	Correspond. Sectoral Controls	0.116	-0.331	-0.049
	(0.103)	(0.263)	(0.053)		(0.561)	(0.340)	(0.165)
Using unclustered r	obust standar	d errors		Using unclustered ro	bust standard	errors	
Correspond. Sectoral Controls	-0.090	-0.389*	-0.091*	Correspond. Sectoral Controls	0.211	0.181	0.095
	(0.092)	(0.212)	(0.047)		(0.548)	(0.210)	(0.138)
Using two-si	tep regression			Using two-st	wo-step regression		
Correspond. Sectoral Controls	-0.099	-0.294**	-0.095*	Correspond. Sectoral Controls	0.108	0.245	0.124
	(0.101)	(0.131)	(0.055)		(0.697)	(0.253)	(0.130)
Using binary s	sectoral contr	ols		Using binary s	ectoral control	's	
Correspond. Sectoral Controls	-0.585	-1.021	-0.309*	Correspond. Sectoral Controls	-0.635	-0.512	-0.165
	(0.450)	(0.836)	(0.168)		(0.929)	(0.745)	(0.587)
Including contemporaneous	and lagged s	ectoral contro	ols	Including contemporaneous	and lagged sec	ctoral control	ls
Correspond. Sectoral Controls (t-1)	-0.091	-0.399**	-0.096*	Correspond. Sectoral Controls (t-1)	0.200	0.180	0.078
	(0.101)	(0.190)	(0.052)		(0.630)	(0.251)	(0.166)
Correspond. Sectoral Controls (t)	-0.019	-0.523**	0.048	Correspond. Sectoral Controls (t)	-0.162	-0.029	-0.193*
	(0.081)	(0.233)	(0.097)		(0.195)	(0.205)	(0.105)
Including controls ap	pplied to other	r sectors		Including controls ap	plied to other	sectors	
Correspond. Sectoral Controls	-0.115	-0.693	-0.110*	Correspond. Sectoral Controls	0.215	0.178	0.093
	(0.100)	(0.429)	(0.058)		(0.627)	(0.246)	(0.161)
BK-only Controls		-0.089	0.021	BK-only Controls		-1.546*	0.200
		(0.265)	(0.050)			(0.733)	(0.297)
NFC-only Controls	0.181		0.312	NFC-only Controls	1.053***		-0.090
	(0.428)		⁽⁰ Resu	Its robust to wide range o	f sensitiv	itv tests	(0.073)
OFC-only Controls	1.157	4.665		OFC-only Controls	-0.025	-0.248	
	(1.367)	(6.649)			(0.321)	(0.180)	



On non-resident flows:

On resident flows:

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)
Non-Resident Flows	NFC+OFC	BK+OFC	NFC+BK	Resident Flows	NFC+OFC	BK+OFC	NFC+BK
Global GDP Growth	-0.086	0.030	0.135	Global GDP Growth	-0.211	-0.400	0.070
	(0.368)	(0.193)	(0.513)		(0.385)	(0.226)	(0.461)
Global Liquidity	0.238	0.157*	0.303	Global Liquidity	0.159	0.084	0.158
	(0.152)	(0.090)	(0.185)		(0.149)	(0.101)	(0.180)
VIX	-0.135	-0.064	-0.138	VIX	-0.039	-0.106*	-0.050
	(0.108)	(0.042)	(0.121)		(0.091)	(0.057)	(0.111)
Global Commodity Price	0.046**	0.006	0.045**	Global Commodity Price	0.031	0.007	0.029
	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.020)		(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Domestic GDP Growth	0.206	0.245**	0.330*	Domestic GDP Growth	-0.029	-0.002	0.055
	(0.171)	(0.087)	(0.184)		(0.085)	(0.056)	(0.137)
BK-only Controls	-0.110			BK-only Controls	-1.346		
	(0.270)				(0.949)	\frown	
NFC-only Controls		0.322		NFC-only Controls		0.961***	
		(0.377)				(0.186)	
OFC-only Controls			5.211	OFC-only Controls			-0.302
			(7.826)				(0.363)
Observations	408	408	408	Observations	198	198	198
R-squared	0.215	0.144	0.221	R-squared	0.212	0.138	0.122
Country F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Country F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes

Tighter controls on resident NFC flows associated with increase in BK and OFC flows pointing to potential circumvention

Sectoral Capital Flows: Covariates, Comovements, and Controls

Main Findings:

- 1) Sectoral resident and nonresident flows exhibit varying responses and sensitivities to global and domestic factors.
- 2) Co-movements between resident and non-resident OFC sectoral flows contribute to the observed positive correlation between gross inflows and outflows.
- 3) Tighter capital controls on BKs and OFCs reduce nonresident inflows to these sectors.



Sudden stops and policy responses: Lessons from recent history for COVID-19

Policy responses

Conditional on:	St	ор	Flig	-	
	Easing	Tight.	Easing	Tight.	•
RBM inflows	74	43	71	27	=
RBM outflows	98	20	147	20	
MPM	53	54	28	41	٠
CBM	12	15	22	14	

Source: Lepers and Mehigan (2019) and OECD (2020)

- **Easing monetary policy** a doubleedged sword: protecting domestic balance sheets but may accelerate outflows
- Sterilised **FX intervention** generally effective in delaying depreciation
- No clear pattern in **CBM** and **MPM** use
- Easing **inflow controls** in stop and flight episodes helpful in some cases
- **Outflow controls** rarely tightened, typically last-resort tool in crises

Capital controls during COVID-19?

[See <u>OECD Report to G20 IFA WG</u> for detailed policy monitoring]

- FX intervention as first line of defence: spot and forward
- Relaxation of (sectoral) inflow controls:
 - ✓ China: eased a ceiling on cross-border financing
 - ✓ Peru: reduced reserve requirements on liabilities to non-residents
 - ✓ India: eased limits on foreign portfolio investments in corporate and government bonds
- No reintroduction of outflow controls (easing in Argentina)
- Currency-based measures: mainly easing, some tightening
 - ✓ FX reserve requirements: Indonesia, Turkey, Peru (easing)
 - ✓ FX derivatives caps: Korea (easing), Turkey (tightening)
 - ✓ FX liquidity ratios: Korea, Sweden (easing), Hungary (tightening)
 - ✓ FX liability levy: Korea (easing)

Thank you !

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